International Nuclear Cyber Security Threat Landscape
Shannon Eggers and Charles Nickerson
Idaho National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1625, MS 3675, Idaho Falls, ID 83415, USA, shannon.eggers@inl.gov
Abstract: The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Nuclear Cyber Team (NCT) is a recognized leader in
international nuclear cyber program assessments as well as nuclear cyber training development and
delivery. This paper discusses how the NCT is implementing their vision to protect global nuclear
infrastructure from cyber threats. Also outlined is the team’s perspectives on the global nuclear cyber threat
landscape and the top ten approachable cyber security measures that can be applied to immediately
improve a country’s nuclear cyber security posture.
INTRODUCTION
The Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) is “dedicated to the safe, secure, and
effective stewardship of nuclear materials and related technologies through the advancement of scientific
knowledge, technical skills, policy dialogue, professional capabilities, and best practices.” INMM is
comprised of six divisions: (1) Facility Operations, (2) International Safeguards, (3) Materials Control &
Accountability, (4) Nonproliferation & Arms Control, (5) Nuclear Security & Physical Protection, and (6)
Packaging, Transportation & Disposition. While nonproliferation is a separate division, it is really an
element of each division. The same argument is valid for cyber security – cyber security is typically grouped
under the nuclear security division but is really an integral component across the entire INMM mission.
INMM’s nonproliferation and cyber security purpose both have the same end goal to promote the peaceful
use of nuclear energy and nuclear material.
Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is the Department of Energy’s lead laboratory for nuclear energy.
Within INL is the National and Homeland Security (N&HS) directorate which has a mission to develop
critical national and homeland security capabilities. Furthermore, as part of N&HS, the Nuclear Cyber Team
(NCT) works domestically and internationally to provide solutions, training, and research to enhance
international nuclear security. In the United States, the nuclear sector is the most regulated critical
infrastructure. In addition, cyber security at nuclear power plants has been regulated since 2009 [1].
Internationally, however, the nuclear cyber security program in many countries is still in its infancy.
The NCT has expertise in control systems specific to nuclear facilities, physical protection systems,
cyber standards and regulations, cyber assessments for critical infrastructure, threat analysis, and training
development and delivery. The vision of NCT is to “protect global nuclear infrastructure from cyber
threats.” This vision is achieved through R&D, domestic and international training programs, university
collaboration, and industry outreach. Training programs have been developed and delivered both
domestically and internationally on topics such as Technical Introduction to Cyber Security for Nuclear and
Radiological Facilitates, Managing Cyber Risks for Nuclear and Radiological Facilities; and for the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Training Courses on Computer Security at Nuclear
Facilities, Conducting Computer Security Assessment at Nuclear Facilities, Threat and Consequence
Awareness, and Protection of Computer-based Systems in Nuclear Security Regimes.

INTERNATIONAL CYBER THREAT LANDSCAPE
In contrast to United States regulations, individual national level regulations throughout the
remainder of the world remain weak and/or unenforceable. In addition, implementation measures at sites
is inconsistent and vulnerable while at the same time the dependencies on digital devices are drastically
increasing. In fact, there is typically a huge disconnect between the level of security actually implemented
compared to the initial security design and the security expectations (Figure 1).

Figure 1. The dichotomy of cyber security implementation.
The continuous evolution of cyber warfare tactics has led to a cyber arms race. As an adversary’s
cyber threat maturity evolves, their proficiency in distorting, disrupting, destructing, disclosing, and
discovering also improves. Consequently, as a threat actor’s sophistication in tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTPs) increases, defensive and protection capabilities must also keep pace, especially as digital
components are added in all areas of the fuel cycle. Ideally, the protection capability to detect, delay, and
respond surpasses, or at least keeps pace, with an adversary’s cyber attack expertise.
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that the cyber attack surface is constantly evolving along
with attack sophistication. Modernization and digitization improves efficiencies and reliability, but also
increases cyber vulnerabilities. Cyber attack vectors also differ depending on the fuel cycle stage – the
cyber attack vector for theft and diversion of nuclear material from a storage facility is much different than
the cyber attack vector during transportation. It is a goal of the NCT to assist the global community in
strengthening their cyber security posture through creation of effective rule-making, regulatory guidance,
implementation documentation, and defense-in-depth strategies.
TOP 10 SECURITY CONTROLS
Defense-in-depth is the application of multiple security controls to reduce the attack surface of an
asset or digital system. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) publication 800.53
revision 4 provides a catalog of security controls for use in information systems [2]. Based on this listing, the
top ten most approachable controls for a cyber awareness campaign are provided in Table 1. The intent of
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using these controls is to immediately improve a facility’s security posture by reducing the number of
outward facing vulnerabilities that an adversary can exploit.
CONCLUSION
The nuclear cyber security threat landscape is constantly changing and becoming more
sophisticated. When combined with the fact that global regulations for nuclear cyber security systems are
often weak or unenforceable and that these implementations do not systematically address cyber risks, the
question becomes not if there will be a nuclear cyber attack, but when. It is imperative that international
outreach continues through collaborations and training programs to increase the cyber security awareness
and maturity of those nations who possess nuclear and radiological facilities and/or material.
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Table 1. Top 10 approachable security controls.
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Action
Establish and document a Cyber Security Plan that is integrated with Site Security Plan
Cyber security plans establish objectives and requirements for cyber security controls. These plans also document
and reference any federal, state, local, and company specific regulations, policies, rules, and procedures to ensure
compliance while maintaining focus on security goals. Other key information contained within the plan could
include network architecture, data flow rulesets, privileges, as well as roles and responsibilities for normal and
emergency situations. Many of the activities defined below will help derive organizational policies contained
within the plan.
Conduct and document an inventory of digital assets
A fundamental rule in cyber security is to understand what devices are operating on the system. A device
inventory can be used to detect unauthorized devices. Key controls for inventorying a system include:
- Define authorized components within each network zone and/or level (if applicable);
- Passively and dynamically track devices and understand how/why they function on the network; and
- Define authorized personnel to configure and maintain devices.
Conduct and document an inventory of software
Organizations should actively manage (inventory, track, control, document, etc.) all software running on their
systems so that only approved and trusted applications can execute and communicate. Understanding which
versions of the software running is critically important; this information can feed patch management efforts and
help identify other security gaps. Unauthorized software should be identified and deleted. Limit personnel with
administrative rights and those that can install software onto the system.
Identify and document secure configurations
Secure configuration development can divided into two distinct efforts:
1. Establish a secure baseline configuration
2. Maintain approved configurations
Manufacturers, vendors, and governmental agencies publish guides and recommendations for hardening the
various executables, privileges, and operations performed by hardware and software.
Conduct vulnerability scans, risk assessments and manage risk
Cyber threat actors seek to detect and exploit coding, configuration, and/or other deployment vulnerabilities of a
system. It is recommended that automated vulnerability scanning tools run on all network systems at regular
intervals using Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) validated tools. See NIST’s website for recommended
SCAP products. Vulnerabilities should be measured against overall system risk and then assigned a risk mitigation.
Minimize and control access to devices and other system interfaces
Access to digital devices should use “Least Privileged Access” policies in order to minimize the quantity and type of
personnel with legitimate access. Organizations should use complementary administrative, physical, and technical
controls to not only govern access but also monitor activities once access has been achieved. Minimize access
“carve-outs” or exceptions that bypass these controls. Identify digital dependencies of security system devices.
Set up network boundary defenses
Use technical controls such as firewalls to inspect all inbound traffic. Application firewalls should be deployed and
configured for non-Web-based applications such as configuration management applications. Firewalls should also
be configured to analyze data flows and directional changes as well as detect and control abnormal bandwidth
consumption.
Set up malware defenses
Multiple automated tools have been developed to continuously monitor workstations, servers, devices, etc. for
the presence of malware on systems. Key malware defenses ensure that digital devices will not automatically run
content from unauthorized drives. Administrative controls should be established so that outside devices (such as
USB drives and vendor laptops) can be scanned before users access the network.
Establish and document an incident response plan
Cyber-attacks will occur. Planning for an attack and developing a response and continuity of operations plan will
help limit the impact/downtime. Key to this planning is identifying the personnel (or roles and responsibilities)
involved should an attack occur. Backing up system data and system configurations is also key to rapid restoration
after an attack. Store backups in a secure location.
Train security personnel on cyber security
Threat actors often seek to exploit gaps in cyber security that exist between what an application is designed to do
and how personnel actually use the application. It is recommended that regular cyber security awareness training
be provided to security personnel. Additionally, it is crucial for cyber security personnel (especially incident
response members) to understand how the security functions and how it is configured. Training both parties is
fundamental.
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